At the outset of 1978, Iran was still a case study of a stable modernizing autocracy. By November of the same year, however, the Shah's apology to the nation, on the public radio, for the oppression and corruption that had been inflicted on the Iranians, indicated that the end had come. In February, 1979 , the regime collapsed. The quick surrender of the regime in the face of seemingIy sustained economic growth, powerful military structure, and growing international posture questions the validity of many theories of revalutian as well as our understanding of Iran. Considering that guerrilla activities had been reduced to few isolated cases and in fact by 1977,guerrilla organizations had become infiltrated, the fall of the monarch to the Revolution is even more enigmatic.
Corruption, oppression and rapid modernization ore often identified as the causes of the Revolution. Had any f these factors, or their combinations, been suffident to bring about a revolution, one might have expected revolutions in a host of other countries before it took pl'ace in Iran. Nor would the dependency of a system within the international arena, as some argue, necessarily lead to a revolution. strengthens the mechanism of the rule of the dependent ruling class. The extra-territorial support may adversely affect the system's legitimacy, but at the same time it sets the balance of power in favor of the dependent rulers. Dependent systems are frequentıy illegitimate to begin with, and their deepndencc ensures their continuation in the face of the lass of legitimacy. Their eventual fall is, consequently, not brought about by their dep€rrdence. Rather, it is an indicatian of the unwillingness or inability of the extra-territorial support to maintain the favorable balance of power.M ost specialists on Iran, as well as the present POW"2,' holders in Iran, have identified yet anather, albeit, a uniquc factor, as the force behind the Revalutian. Shiism, a particular Islaınic belief pattern, prevalent in Iran only, is singled out as the precipitating element of the Revolution.
3 it is argued that Shiism, in contrast to other Islaınic schools, withholds legitimacy from the political authorities, identifies rulers as usurpcrs, and thus it is fundaınentally a revolutionary belief system. it is further ar:gued that Shiism has an organization format, in the form of clergy, and is financially independent of the state.
In fact, the 40,000or so mosques in Iran played an important role as a cellular structure within which the populace gather.:d with impunity, where information was disseminated, and the the United States as a m~jor contributing factor towards the making of the Revolution.
This explanation, also, serves the ideologi.:n.: pasition of the presem Iranian government which at times !ı;ıs justified the Revolution İl' terms of opposition to the former system;i dependence on the U.S. demonstrations were planned. The high elerical's social position in Iran has alsa depended on aloofness from the political authority. This in turn has been normally translated into greater trust manifested by the populace and a greater share of khoms, the rdigious tax, so far voluntarily paid to any elergyman. AyataIlah Khomaini apparently received more in voluntary donations than the Shah'.: government collected in taxes during the year which preceded the Revolution.
The religious explanation, limited to the Iranian situation is much too narrow to be of explanatory value to the general unde:rstanding of the revolutionary phenomenon. Revlutions have occurred in places where Shiism has been absent. Conversely, Shiism has been popular in Iran many centuries without necessarily being revolutionary. While the Shii elergy has often played an anti-imperialist role their attempts have b22n historically aimed at retreating thp status quo ante, rather than restructuring the society. This paper argues that the Iranian Revolution can be properly understood in the context of the historical conflict between the center and the periph€ry. The central states has been generally personified in the form of a person, i.c. the fuler. The periphery consisted of those not affiliated with the ruler as memibers of his household. The percei ver inabili~y of the ruler to guard the interests of the periphery against extraterritorial powers and his demands for the universal subjectian to his rule within his kingdam set the stage for conflict. What makes the Iranian Revolution more radical than its historica1 antecedents is a elass dimension was added to the earlier c:ıuscs of conflict. The overlapping of center-versus-perıphery tensİon with that of elass conflict transformed the Iranian Revalutian from a simple traditional conflict for pOW€rinto a social r2VO-lution which demandca the complete re-structuring of the society. Th2 survival of the center-periphery tcnsion, on the cthtr hand, has colored the ideology and directian of the change.
CycIes of Mndenı Iranian History:
Up to the end of the 18th century, the Shii thought followed the Akhbari school in which all authority was pres:.ımcd to bdong to the Hidd:::n Imam, a messiah. In his abs2nc2 no one could SEt claim to his sacred or secular authority.4 The negation of the legitimncy of the actual authorities was not necessarily revolutionary. In fact, it led to political quietism as it was pointkss to replace one set of rulers for another who would be equally illegıtimate. In the absense of any mode of legitimation, governmenis remained military phenomena. Based on actual power alone, they were necessarily unstable, as power relations fluctuate p2riodicaUy.
In contrast to the presumed tradition of monarchy in Iran, most dynasties during the Islamic period have been short-lind and most have been Turkish, depending on military force and the populace's preferEnce for order to disorder. They rose and feU independent of a religious structure, or populace's will, much in the Marxian Asiatic type.
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Division of the society into cellular semi-autonomous communities which contained all the conditions for production and reproduction and consequently the absence of class structure did not give the society the mechanism of supporting or opposing the government. The inherent paralysis of the society gaye the appearance that the state was omnipotent. Faced with each isolated community, the state was despotic. Lacking social support, the state often feU to other forces without much change in the lives of ordinary subjects. The history of Islamic Iran has been a history of political instability. The present chaos is not an aberration. Rather, it is a new phase of conflict in the Iranian society.
In the beginning or the Nineteenth Century two developments, one ideational and the other one objective, brought about an integrative process in Iran and provided the society with mechanisms to oppose the state.
1) The Usuli school, which became dominant in the Shii thought in the 19th century, enjoined the Shiites to follow the teachings of a livi"g theologian Consequently, a new group emerged which closely resembles the clergy in the Christendom both functionaIly and institutionaIly.6 As deputies to the Imam, they were collectively the leaders of the Shii community and the embodiment and the routinization of the Imam's charisma. A5 Iran was the only Shiite country, the clergy's leadership of the religious community developed nation::ı.listic and political ramifications, as welL. During the Nineteenth Century, when imperialism was increa5ingly dividing up the world, the clergy was called upon time and again to defend the Shii nation, Le. Iran.
2) Political centralization, expansion of monetary relations, and increases in commodity exchange and further communication led to the development and differentiation of the bourgeoisie in an embryonic form. In the Nineteenth Century the penetration of the Iranian economy by the imperial power", and the growing integration of the former within the world market system during the sam~period, adversely affected the nascent bourgeoisie. More specifically, the mercantile bourgeoisie and the productive national bourgeoisie, found their activities curtailed and their pı'oductions not competitive with the cheap and machine made European commodities. The state at the same time became increasingly dependent on cash as a cons2quenc..; of its integration in the world market system and the extension of monetary relations. Thus, not only was the state reluctant to accept taxes in kind, but it continuously attempted to ameliorate the economic hardships by granting monopoly rights for immediate cash.
7 These measures burdened the peasantry, on iVOL. XX the one hand, and the bourgeoisie on the other. The peasantry cıtomized and atavistic could not resist. The bourgeoisie did.
The Reuter Concession of 1872 in which Nasir al-Din Shah, 1848-1896, granted almast all of his country as a coneession to a foreign national and Regie Concession of [1891] [1892] in whieh te tobacco trade was given as a monopoly to a British Suıbject are cases in point. 8 In each case, the monaı"ch curtailed his subjects' eeonomic sphere in return for ready cash. In each case, the monareh was opposed by an alliance of the clergy, speaking for the people against government's excesses, and the bourgeoisie whose economic interests were threatened by the Western penetration.
This pattem of alliance repeated itself during the Constitutional Revolution, 1905-1909, where both the clergy and the bourgeoisie attempted to set limits on the arbitrariness of the king's rule. The Constitutional Revolution did not aim ai; establishing democracy. Rather, it was intended to divide politieal authority along traditionallines. The chureh and the bourgeoisie as well as the king were to share power. The compositian of the first Parliament, divided into three estates ,the nobles, the merchants and guild masters and the ulama, attest, to this.
Such delieate balance eould not be easily maintained. The full impact of imperia1ism in the form of division of Iran between Russia and Britain into spheres of influence in 1907, and later the Bolshevik threat, and the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, which practically attempted to turn Iran into a British protectorate, ma de the continuation of the. power eonfiguration in Iran impossible. The ehaotic Iranian situation and the development of republies along the Soviet line, convineed the British as well as many of the Iranians of the necessity of setting up a strong central government. The Coup of 1921 whieh subsequentıy brought the Pahla,vis to power, The pattem of conflict betweenthe center and the periph2ry has been endemic to Iranian history. The success of the center is m.arked by its penetration of the periphery and attempt at its complete subjugation. Overextension of the center, in addition to its weak organizational base, and its inClibilityto legitimate itself, have historically led to the resurgence of the peripheral forces and defeat of the center. Given the disarray of the peripheral forces, ,md their often atavistic nature, chaos became the predominant form of political behavior, which in turn prepared the way for the emergence of a despotic center.
The predominance of the center during the first phase of the Pahlavi rule came to an end when Riza Shah abidcated in 1941. From 1941 until 1953 the peripheral forces, consisting of the landowners, triballeaders, the clergy, and the bourgeoisie vied for power. The intervention of another world power, the U.S. and the general disaffection helped Muhammed Riza Shah, 1941-1979, to assert his authoıity in 1953 and thus the cycle of despotism began. The clergy, concerned about the threat of communism, suspicious of extensive politicization of the population, had brolken ranks with Muhammed Musaddiq, the liberalnationalist prime minister, [1951] [1952] [1953] , before the coup toppled him.
The last two cycles of peripheral dominance, the Constitutional Period and Musaddiqera, were the cycles in which liberal ideology was followed by the declaratiôn of Iran's dependence on imperial powers and then the rise of Riza Shah, 1926~1941. The liıberal government of Musaddiq was followed by despotism and growing American influence. The defeats of both liberal efforts have created questions regarding not only the efficacy but for that matter the legitimacy of liberalism which pres2ntly color the Iranian Revolution and are used to lcgitimize its illiiberal tendencies.
-------- 
1941-1953
Peripheral hegemony: f;xtensive liberalism; foreign oceupation; nationalism; re-asserticn of religious and tribal forees.
1953-1978
Central hegemony:
The most eomplete penetmtion of the society by the government in the Iranian history; personalism, destruetion of conser vative positions of leadership in the periphery; transformation of the soeiety into a class one.
1978-Present
Peripheral hegemony: Revolution; re-emergenee of religious Icadership; re-ass3rticn of centripetal sentiments: Kurds, Turkcmans, Baluch, ete.,; foreign invasion.
The Revolution of 1978-79: The present regime in Iran is the third cycle of the peripheral upsurge in this centuryand was characterized at first by the participation of the same centrifugal social forces which put an end to the central authorities of the past: the national bourgeoisie, the clergy, the bureaucratic stratum, and the intelligentsia.
The present cycle, however, is different from its percursors in three ways. Firstly, it has managed to destroy the center so violentıy and successfully, that its chances for a comeback in the former style and compasition are much reduced compared to the farmer cycles. Secondly, the traditional peripheral hie-rarchies which had maintained a symbiotic relation with the center, tribal chiefs, landowners, etc., were eradicated in the post-1953 developments. Their moderating influences which existed earlier do not exist any more. The co-existence which prevailed earlier between the center and the periphery during the latter's ascendcncy does not exist anymore, either. Thirdly, the Iranian class structure today is radical1y different from that of the earlier comparable cycles. The peasant structure has finally given to an urban one, where the majorityare city dWE:llersand the cconomy is dominated by nonagrarian sectors. The similarity of the present cycle with the former ones is that chaos is the order of the day. The intensity of the chaos compared to the former cyc:les is paralleled by the intensity of the disaffection with the present regime and its increasing isolation.
The intensity of the Iranian Revolution has been partly due to the earlier elimination of the intermediary loci of power between the ruler and the populace. The simplification of the hierarchy of authority mto a dichotomy intensified the conflict between the ruler and the ruled. Mareover, at no other period had the center penetrated the society so intensely. Not only did the oil, a state monopoly, dominate the economy, but the state increasingly interfered in the daily lives of the people in the forms of new modes of regularization and establishment oı controls. No modern state can escape such interventions. But the interventions of a personalistic state in the lives of its subjects is often dis-stabilizing in the long run.
Given the cyclical pattem of the past Iranian history, i.e., centralizing personal despotism, followed by peripheral resurrection, anarchy, and despotism again, the re-emergence of the centrifugal forces could have been anticipated. The elements which brought about the earlier cycles existed in 1978. The assumption of political stability under the 8hah was therefore historicaııy short-sighted. In addition to the forces which had historically operated in Iran, modern forces had come into existence which were fundamentally in contraclietion to the prevailing political structul'e.
The Iranian political system until the fall of the 8hah in 1979 was a patrimonial one where rulership \Vas conceived as property belonginıg to a family. Office holders were member5 of the ruler's household. Patrimonial relations alsa permeated the society until 1963 when the land reform program undermined the authority of the agrari,an lords, and the conservative religious opposition to the system was brutally put down in 1963. The mode of the government, however, in contradiction to the social change remained patrimonial. The facade of modernity only painted over the fact that Iran of 1978 was a personalistic state where the decisions were made arbitrarily in an increasingly complex society.
The often stated claim that the Shah modernized much too fast and society remained deepIy traditional and the contradietion between modunization and the society's traditionalism brought about the Revolution is misleading. On the contrary, the structure of Iranian politics was frozen in it:> traditional shape, Le., the,state was anthropomorphized in form of a person. The s()ciety, nevertheles5, was increasingly developing along class lines.
Between 1966 and 1976, the wage-Iabor system expanded rapidly at the expense of the non-wage system. The working class, those who sold their labar, became numericaIly the dominant class in 1976, accounting for 54.1 % of the Iabor force. In 1966, they constitutE:d only 48.4% of the work force. The relative sizes of the bO'jrgeoisie, those who employed the labar of others, and the petty-bourgeoisie, those who were self-empIoyed, actually declined respectively from 2.2 to 2.1 and from 49.3 to 43.8. In short, within a decade Iran had developed the characteristics of a dominantly working class socicty.
The Iranian working class, however, was not an industrial proletariat. The majority worked in smail shops which employed less than ten workers. Those who workEd in inciustrial plants, employing ten or more workers accounted for only 5.3% of the work force. . ,
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ing class structure. At'the same time, the industrial proletariat was much too smaIl to become the vanguard of a radical social revolution. The leadership of the Revolution fen to the traditional working class whose eoncentration in urban centers gave them the necessary bases for organization solidarity and had numerical superiority. The Shah's Westerııization was particularly disturbing to the members of this class. Modern industry threatened their existence, just as the economic penetration of Iran by the imperialist forees, a century earlier, h;:ıd threatened the ir predecessors. The petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie were also being seriously threatened by the development of smaIl but powerıul monopolist capitalists, who, utilizing a network of political ('onnections, capital intensive industry, and modern technology, actuaIly shifted the center of Iranian (;conomy from the labyrinth of the bazaar to the boulevards of northern Tehran. The monopolist capitalists were closely associated with the PahJavi familyand supported the system. Their support, howeve:, was not crucial due to their many contradictions within themselves and with the personalistic and arbitrary regime. Furthermore, as a class they depended on the system for the grants of monopoly rights. In other words, in contrast to Marxian analysis, monopolist capitalists existC'd because of the dynamics of the political factors rather than any economic factors. When the political rule wea'kened in the process of the Revalutian, this class was not in a pasition to lend support to the system.
The industrial proletariat remainer apolitical until the fate of the regime was almost sealed. At the end of the summer of 1978, the oil workers and electrical workers went on strike. The industrial proletariat employed in the private sectar did not stop work until towards the end of 1978 when raw material became scaree. While the industrial proletariat eould not supporl the patrimonial regime in the long run, as alahor aristocraey, İts support for the Revolutian was not whole-hearted. Since the Revolution, it has lost many privileges bestawed on it by the former regime. Profit-sharing regulations are discarded as they purportedly helped only few workers -those in lar:ge private industry. Workers in many plants in the private sectar, Iran National, the largest automobile plant in Iran, for instance, are threatened with lock-outs.
IVOL. XX
When the Shah's personal patrimonial rule weakened in the fa ce of riots and strikes, including those by the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Interior, charged with internal security of the country, the Shah formed an alliance with the militaryon November 5, 1978. While his rule had always relied on a military basis, the Shah had successfully refused to let the military play a role in the political decision-making process since 1953. The alliance indicClted the monarchy's weakness, but it alsa showed its fear of complete military take-over.
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When in power, the Shah had seen to it t.he military command was fragmented, united only in his person. Units werc disallowed from communicating with each other. Sectoral jealousies were encouraged and military intelligence was gather€:d by many organizations with overlapping spheres of authority. Consequently, the declaration of martial lawand military government SE:8medalmost as threatening to the Shah as the riots waged daily. The government of the generals was forced on the weakened monarch by the heads of the services in a concerted action which made the likelihood of complete military take-over even more ralistic. The Shah did his best to set controls on military actions against the riots and complete c(mtral of the ministri<:::sby the generals. Less than two weeks after the declaration of the military government, the civilians began to replace the generals in the cabinet. The military government was a farce. Posing no threat to the monarchy, it was alsa toolhless to defend it. The chances of the Shah's survival in November of 1978 were not good. The Shah's fear of the military made them worse. The trump card, i.e. the military, was drawn and then was partially pulled back and thus was wasted.
The continuation of strikes and riots and the inability of the military to respond to them, compelled the Shah to invite the National Front, Musaddiq's followers to share power with him. Shahpour Bakhtiar accepted the challange on December Iranian Studies, Vol. XIII, Nos. 1.4, l0e~.
pp. 327-368. 29, 1978 . Immediately expelled by the Front, he was stilI the first premier since Musaddiq to rE:present the liberal bourgeoisie instead of merely being cm extension of the Shah.
Bakhtiar's political reforms during his six-week tenure of office, such as the Shah's departure from the country, lifting of censorship, abalition of the secret police, and release of political prisoners further fueled the fury of the Revolution and convinced those who still needed convincing that the cause of the Shah was a lost one.
At each step during the Revolution the scope of politics became larger. 1978 began with politics b2ing the exclusive realm of the Shah. In November, he was forced to share it with the military. In DE:conber he was forced to look towards the National Front whom he deeply despised. The troika of the monarcy, the military and a section of liberal bourgeoisie was not enough to tip the balance in favor of the Shah. On February 11, 179, the old structures of authority were defeated. The military submitted to the forces of the Revalutian and a new allliance took over.
Post-Revolutİonary Iran:
At the top the new system of authority was not very different from the one just replaced. The element" of the liberal bourgeoisie were ostensibly in charge of the government. Mahdi Bazargan formed a cabinet whose members were Bakhtiar's former associates. The new government attempted to reduce the goals of the Revolution to the abolition of the mnarchy which had aıready been achieved. They failed, however, to stop the Revolution and return to normal politics because the formal holders of pow~rs, i.e. the liberal bourgeoisie, were not the vanguard of the Revolution. Lacking a solid social base in the Iranian society and having been supp1'essed by the Shah they did not have the resources and organizational ability to stop the further radicalization of the Revolution.
On more than one occasion, Bazargan declared that the Revolution was over and requested the return of the expatriated enterpreneu1's and managers to Iran in order to continue thcir direction of the economy. Serious efforts were made to no1'-lVOL. XX malize the relations with the U.S. which until recently had supported the Shah. In short, the liberals' aim was to turn the Iranian Revolution into a bourgeois anti-absolutist one.
The liberal bourgeoısie was only formally in charge of the state. Conflict within its ranks weakened it even more, leading into further fragmentatlOn of the National Front, shake-up of the cabinet, dismissal of the Director of the Netional Oil Company and Chief of the Staff. What proved to be fatal to the bourgeoisie was that the actual positions of power were controIled by the members of the petty-bourgE.Oisie. SmaIl shopkeeper3 and lower-ranking clergy controIled the Revolutionary Guards, Committees, and Courts. None of these centers of power paid even lip service to the government. The premier \Vas often informed of major decisions by listening to the radio. The Committees not only controIled and güvemed the city, but they graduaIly came to control the bureaucracy. also. They purge{{ the bureaucrats whom they found undesirable and even arrested one minister.
The ta'ke-over of the American Embassy on November 4, 1979 on the pretext of the Shah's admission to the U.S. and Bazargan's meeting with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the American National Security Advisor, finally put an end to any doubts that the liberal bourgeoi~ie might be in control. A few elements of this class who had curried favor with the more radical pettybourgeoisie and the traditional working class, such as the former President Abu al-Hasan Beni-Sadr and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadiq Qutbzadih, were graduaIly to be discarded, as welL.
The Revolution has so far primarily been the gift of the traditional working class and the petty-bourgeoisie. Consequently, it has little appreci'ation for modern industry and its social relations. it is symptomatic of the regim2's onerıtation that atomic plants hav~been converted into silas. The penetration of Iran by the \vorld capitalist systems meant the anachronization of the trilditiünal "vorkers cmd the petty-bourgecisie. Consequently, the present Iranian regime, voicing the wishes of this class is xenophobic. !ts appeals are only sup2r-ficiaIly supra-nationalist under the guise of Islamic solidarity.
In fact, the latter i~used, albeit unsuccessfully, and crudely, for interventian in the affairs of others and search for regional supremacy. The traditiorral working class is suspicious of thç foreign and Marxist revolutionary formulae, but it reacts favorably to the formulatıons of its own aspirations presented by the clergy in Islamic forms.
The complete destruction of the ancient regime and the inherent and histarical weakness of the liberal-bourgeoisie. have permitted the Revolution to become continuousIy more radicalized. When the revolutionary leadership is unable to exercise control, revolutions normally become more widespread. The Iranian Revolution was a spontaneous and leadersless revolution. The revolutionary elite which developed in th'p rocess of revolution in China and elsewhere did not come into existence in Iran during the short period of uprising. The present ruling group, consisting of the clergy and their allies however, have become more experienced in organizing ane the running of a government in the past three years. Their rule is nevertheless not insured, given their inability to respond to the economic problems and minarities' demands, on the one hand, and pressures from popular ıslamic Mujahidins from the left, on the other.
